09 28 06 Cleric is said to lose reins over part
Cleric is said to lose reins over part of Iraqi militia
By Sabrina Tavernise The New York Times
Published: September 28, 2006
BAGHDAD The radical Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr has lost control of portions of his Mahdi Army militia that are splintering off into freelance death squads and criminal gangs, a senior coalition intelligence official said Wednesday.
The question of how tightly Sadr holds the militia, one of the largest armed groups in Iraq, is of critical importance to American and Iraqi officials. Seeking to ease the sectarian violence raging across the country, they have pressed him to join the political process and curb his fighters, who see themselves as defenders of Shiism - and often as agents of vengeance against Sunnis.
But as Sadr has taken a more active role in the government, as many as a third of his militiamen have grown frustrated with the constraints of compromise and have broken off, often selling their services to the highest bidders, said the official, who spoke to reporters in Baghdad on condition of anonymity because he was not permitted to speak publicly on intelligence issues.
"When Sadr says you can't do this, for whatever political reason, that's when they start to go rogue," the official said. "Frankly, at that point, they start to become very open to alternative sources of sponsorship." The official said that opened the door to control by Iran.
Sadr's militia - dominated by impoverished Shiites who are loosely organized into groups that resemble neighborhood protection forces - has always operated in a grass-roots style but generally tended to heed his commands. It answered his call to battle American forces in two uprisings in 2004, and stopped fighting when he ordered it. But as the violence in Iraq has spread, evidence of freelancing Shiites has accumulated.
After the bombing of a Shiite shrine in Samarra in February, bands of militants dressed in black, the favorite color of Sadr loyalists, drove into neighborhoods, kidnapping and killing Sunnis. Sadr, who was abroad at the time, returned home and gave a rare public speech calling on his followers to stop, even proposing joint prayer sessions with Sunni clerics. Still, the rampage continued.
In Basra, a province in southeastern Iraq, Sadr has less direct control over militiamen, and they have tended to operate to suit their own agenda. Local leaders there have said that he has disciplined some members and fired others, but with little overall effect. He has run through four different leaders in Basra, according to the intelligence official, and has even had to shut offices temporarily, when local leaders ignored him and acted on their own.
Sadr is still immensely powerful, with as many as 7,000 militiamen in Baghdad, the official said. And the cleric has turned that firepower into political might. His candidate list won about 30 seats in Parliament this year, one of the largest shares. The participation was a central goal for American officials, who tried for months to persuade him to stop fighting and enter politics.
Still, six major leaders here no longer answer to Sadr's organization, according to the intelligence official. Most describe themselves as Mahdi Army members, the official said, and even get money from Sadr's organization, but "are effectively beyond his control." Some of those who moved away from Sadr saw him as too accommodating to the United States. Others saw him as too bound by politics, particularly as killings of Shiite civilians in mixed neighborhoods began to soar.
"They're not content to sit there and just defend their family on the street corner," the official said. "They want to go out and take on what they view as Al Qaeda or Baathists or both in aggressive measure."
One example is Abu Dera, a fighter in the Shiite stronghold of Sadr City in the capital who used to be loyal to Sadr. Residents said that as he began to gain a reputation for killing Sunni figures, Sadr told him to stop. But he ignored the order, and now he is referred to as the "Shiite Zarqawi," after Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the terrorist leader who exhorted Sunnis to kill Shiites.
"He started against the Americans, but he moved on to killing Sunnis," said Sattar Awad, a 29-year-old resident of the district. "People here look at him as a brave man."
American forces are hunting for Dera, the intelligence officer said, but he has eluded capture.
Although the splintering has solved some problems for the American military, it has raised new ones. "In some ways it makes it easier for me because I now have digestible doses I can deal with," said a senior American military official at a briefing on Wednesday, also in Baghdad. "At the same time it creates problems because they are harder to find when they are splintered."
The splintering has changed the tone of the American military's interaction with the Mahdi Army in Sadr City. In past years, American forays into the area would often draw a storm of grenade attacks. But recent American moves into the area have been carried out relatively peacefully: Sadr has not ordered attacks because the men being sought were freelancers like Abu Dera, the intelligence officer said.
The fighters' defections have raised the troubling prospect of more avenues of influence for Iran, the senior intelligence official said. The official cited shipments of weapons with labels that trace back to Iranian weapons manufacturers as evidence that Iran was actively aiding groups in Iraq. And that assistance has not just been limited to Mahdi Army offshoots. "They're not sure who will come out on top, so they fund everybody," the official said of Iran.
Even Sadr, who fashions himself as the quintessential Iraqi nationalist, has reached out to Iran's government, making a very public trip to Iran for talks early this year. He is also trying to reassert control over his power base at home, and to expand his influence, the intelligence official said. "What Sadr is looking for is discipline," the official said.
He said Sadr had begun to increase his exposure in the northern city of Kirkuk and in Diyala Province, both mixed-population areas north of Baghdad where sectarian disputes have been on the rise. There, he is trying to appeal by casting himself as a defender of Shiites against Kurdish and Sunni Arab factions.
Richard A. Oppel Jr. contributed reporting.
BAGHDAD The radical Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr has lost control of portions of his Mahdi Army militia that are splintering off into freelance death squads and criminal gangs, a senior coalition intelligence official said Wednesday.
The question of how tightly Sadr holds the militia, one of the largest armed groups in Iraq, is of critical importance to American and Iraqi officials. Seeking to ease the sectarian violence raging across the country, they have pressed him to join the political process and curb his fighters, who see themselves as defenders of Shiism - and often as agents of vengeance against Sunnis.
But as Sadr has taken a more active role in the government, as many as a third of his militiamen have grown frustrated with the constraints of compromise and have broken off, often selling their services to the highest bidders, said the official, who spoke to reporters in Baghdad on condition of anonymity because he was not permitted to speak publicly on intelligence issues.
"When Sadr says you can't do this, for whatever political reason, that's when they start to go rogue," the official said. "Frankly, at that point, they start to become very open to alternative sources of sponsorship." The official said that opened the door to control by Iran.
Sadr's militia - dominated by impoverished Shiites who are loosely organized into groups that resemble neighborhood protection forces - has always operated in a grass-roots style but generally tended to heed his commands. It answered his call to battle American forces in two uprisings in 2004, and stopped fighting when he ordered it. But as the violence in Iraq has spread, evidence of freelancing Shiites has accumulated.
After the bombing of a Shiite shrine in Samarra in February, bands of militants dressed in black, the favorite color of Sadr loyalists, drove into neighborhoods, kidnapping and killing Sunnis. Sadr, who was abroad at the time, returned home and gave a rare public speech calling on his followers to stop, even proposing joint prayer sessions with Sunni clerics. Still, the rampage continued.
In Basra, a province in southeastern Iraq, Sadr has less direct control over militiamen, and they have tended to operate to suit their own agenda. Local leaders there have said that he has disciplined some members and fired others, but with little overall effect. He has run through four different leaders in Basra, according to the intelligence official, and has even had to shut offices temporarily, when local leaders ignored him and acted on their own.
Sadr is still immensely powerful, with as many as 7,000 militiamen in Baghdad, the official said. And the cleric has turned that firepower into political might. His candidate list won about 30 seats in Parliament this year, one of the largest shares. The participation was a central goal for American officials, who tried for months to persuade him to stop fighting and enter politics.
Still, six major leaders here no longer answer to Sadr's organization, according to the intelligence official. Most describe themselves as Mahdi Army members, the official said, and even get money from Sadr's organization, but "are effectively beyond his control." Some of those who moved away from Sadr saw him as too accommodating to the United States. Others saw him as too bound by politics, particularly as killings of Shiite civilians in mixed neighborhoods began to soar.
"They're not content to sit there and just defend their family on the street corner," the official said. "They want to go out and take on what they view as Al Qaeda or Baathists or both in aggressive measure."
One example is Abu Dera, a fighter in the Shiite stronghold of Sadr City in the capital who used to be loyal to Sadr. Residents said that as he began to gain a reputation for killing Sunni figures, Sadr told him to stop. But he ignored the order, and now he is referred to as the "Shiite Zarqawi," after Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the terrorist leader who exhorted Sunnis to kill Shiites.
"He started against the Americans, but he moved on to killing Sunnis," said Sattar Awad, a 29-year-old resident of the district. "People here look at him as a brave man."
American forces are hunting for Dera, the intelligence officer said, but he has eluded capture.
Although the splintering has solved some problems for the American military, it has raised new ones. "In some ways it makes it easier for me because I now have digestible doses I can deal with," said a senior American military official at a briefing on Wednesday, also in Baghdad. "At the same time it creates problems because they are harder to find when they are splintered."
The splintering has changed the tone of the American military's interaction with the Mahdi Army in Sadr City. In past years, American forays into the area would often draw a storm of grenade attacks. But recent American moves into the area have been carried out relatively peacefully: Sadr has not ordered attacks because the men being sought were freelancers like Abu Dera, the intelligence officer said.
The fighters' defections have raised the troubling prospect of more avenues of influence for Iran, the senior intelligence official said. The official cited shipments of weapons with labels that trace back to Iranian weapons manufacturers as evidence that Iran was actively aiding groups in Iraq. And that assistance has not just been limited to Mahdi Army offshoots. "They're not sure who will come out on top, so they fund everybody," the official said of Iran.
Even Sadr, who fashions himself as the quintessential Iraqi nationalist, has reached out to Iran's government, making a very public trip to Iran for talks early this year. He is also trying to reassert control over his power base at home, and to expand his influence, the intelligence official said. "What Sadr is looking for is discipline," the official said.
He said Sadr had begun to increase his exposure in the northern city of Kirkuk and in Diyala Province, both mixed-population areas north of Baghdad where sectarian disputes have been on the rise. There, he is trying to appeal by casting himself as a defender of Shiites against Kurdish and Sunni Arab factions.
Richard A. Oppel Jr. contributed reporting.
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By Sabrina Tavernise The New York Times
Published: September 28, 2006
BAGHDAD The radical Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr has lost control of portions of his Mahdi Army militia that are splintering off into freelance death squads and criminal gangs, a senior coalition intelligence official said Wednesday.
The question of how tightly Sadr holds the militia, one of the largest armed groups in Iraq, is of critical importance to American and Iraqi officials. Seeking to ease the sectarian violence raging across the country, they have pressed him to join the political process and curb his fighters, who see themselves as defenders of Shiism - and often as agents of vengeance against Sunnis.
But as Sadr has taken a more active role in the government, as many as a third of his militiamen have grown frustrated with the constraints of compromise and have broken off, often selling their services to the highest bidders, said the official, who spoke to reporters in Baghdad on condition of anonymity because he was not permitted to speak publicly on intelligence issues.
"When Sadr says you can't do this, for whatever political reason, that's when they start to go rogue," the official said. "Frankly, at that point, they start to become very open to alternative sources of sponsorship." The official said that opened the door to control by Iran.
Sadr's militia - dominated by impoverished Shiites who are loosely organized into groups that resemble neighborhood protection forces - has always operated in a grass-roots style but generally tended to heed his commands. It answered his call to battle American forces in two uprisings in 2004, and stopped fighting when he ordered it. But as the violence in Iraq has spread, evidence of freelancing Shiites has accumulated.
After the bombing of a Shiite shrine in Samarra in February, bands of militants dressed in black, the favorite color of Sadr loyalists, drove into neighborhoods, kidnapping and killing Sunnis. Sadr, who was abroad at the time, returned home and gave a rare public speech calling on his followers to stop, even proposing joint prayer sessions with Sunni clerics. Still, the rampage continued.
In Basra, a province in southeastern Iraq, Sadr has less direct control over militiamen, and they have tended to operate to suit their own agenda. Local leaders there have said that he has disciplined some members and fired others, but with little overall effect. He has run through four different leaders in Basra, according to the intelligence official, and has even had to shut offices temporarily, when local leaders ignored him and acted on their own.
Sadr is still immensely powerful, with as many as 7,000 militiamen in Baghdad, the official said. And the cleric has turned that firepower into political might. His candidate list won about 30 seats in Parliament this year, one of the largest shares. The participation was a central goal for American officials, who tried for months to persuade him to stop fighting and enter politics.
Still, six major leaders here no longer answer to Sadr's organization, according to the intelligence official. Most describe themselves as Mahdi Army members, the official said, and even get money from Sadr's organization, but "are effectively beyond his control." Some of those who moved away from Sadr saw him as too accommodating to the United States. Others saw him as too bound by politics, particularly as killings of Shiite civilians in mixed neighborhoods began to soar.
"They're not content to sit there and just defend their family on the street corner," the official said. "They want to go out and take on what they view as Al Qaeda or Baathists or both in aggressive measure."
One example is Abu Dera, a fighter in the Shiite stronghold of Sadr City in the capital who used to be loyal to Sadr. Residents said that as he began to gain a reputation for killing Sunni figures, Sadr told him to stop. But he ignored the order, and now he is referred to as the "Shiite Zarqawi," after Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the terrorist leader who exhorted Sunnis to kill Shiites.
"He started against the Americans, but he moved on to killing Sunnis," said Sattar Awad, a 29-year-old resident of the district. "People here look at him as a brave man."
American forces are hunting for Dera, the intelligence officer said, but he has eluded capture.
Although the splintering has solved some problems for the American military, it has raised new ones. "In some ways it makes it easier for me because I now have digestible doses I can deal with," said a senior American military official at a briefing on Wednesday, also in Baghdad. "At the same time it creates problems because they are harder to find when they are splintered."
The splintering has changed the tone of the American military's interaction with the Mahdi Army in Sadr City. In past years, American forays into the area would often draw a storm of grenade attacks. But recent American moves into the area have been carried out relatively peacefully: Sadr has not ordered attacks because the men being sought were freelancers like Abu Dera, the intelligence officer said.
The fighters' defections have raised the troubling prospect of more avenues of influence for Iran, the senior intelligence official said. The official cited shipments of weapons with labels that trace back to Iranian weapons manufacturers as evidence that Iran was actively aiding groups in Iraq. And that assistance has not just been limited to Mahdi Army offshoots. "They're not sure who will come out on top, so they fund everybody," the official said of Iran.
Even Sadr, who fashions himself as the quintessential Iraqi nationalist, has reached out to Iran's government, making a very public trip to Iran for talks early this year. He is also trying to reassert control over his power base at home, and to expand his influence, the intelligence official said. "What Sadr is looking for is discipline," the official said.
He said Sadr had begun to increase his exposure in the northern city of Kirkuk and in Diyala Province, both mixed-population areas north of Baghdad where sectarian disputes have been on the rise. There, he is trying to appeal by casting himself as a defender of Shiites against Kurdish and Sunni Arab factions.
Richard A. Oppel Jr. contributed reporting.
BAGHDAD The radical Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr has lost control of portions of his Mahdi Army militia that are splintering off into freelance death squads and criminal gangs, a senior coalition intelligence official said Wednesday.
The question of how tightly Sadr holds the militia, one of the largest armed groups in Iraq, is of critical importance to American and Iraqi officials. Seeking to ease the sectarian violence raging across the country, they have pressed him to join the political process and curb his fighters, who see themselves as defenders of Shiism - and often as agents of vengeance against Sunnis.
But as Sadr has taken a more active role in the government, as many as a third of his militiamen have grown frustrated with the constraints of compromise and have broken off, often selling their services to the highest bidders, said the official, who spoke to reporters in Baghdad on condition of anonymity because he was not permitted to speak publicly on intelligence issues.
"When Sadr says you can't do this, for whatever political reason, that's when they start to go rogue," the official said. "Frankly, at that point, they start to become very open to alternative sources of sponsorship." The official said that opened the door to control by Iran.
Sadr's militia - dominated by impoverished Shiites who are loosely organized into groups that resemble neighborhood protection forces - has always operated in a grass-roots style but generally tended to heed his commands. It answered his call to battle American forces in two uprisings in 2004, and stopped fighting when he ordered it. But as the violence in Iraq has spread, evidence of freelancing Shiites has accumulated.
After the bombing of a Shiite shrine in Samarra in February, bands of militants dressed in black, the favorite color of Sadr loyalists, drove into neighborhoods, kidnapping and killing Sunnis. Sadr, who was abroad at the time, returned home and gave a rare public speech calling on his followers to stop, even proposing joint prayer sessions with Sunni clerics. Still, the rampage continued.
In Basra, a province in southeastern Iraq, Sadr has less direct control over militiamen, and they have tended to operate to suit their own agenda. Local leaders there have said that he has disciplined some members and fired others, but with little overall effect. He has run through four different leaders in Basra, according to the intelligence official, and has even had to shut offices temporarily, when local leaders ignored him and acted on their own.
Sadr is still immensely powerful, with as many as 7,000 militiamen in Baghdad, the official said. And the cleric has turned that firepower into political might. His candidate list won about 30 seats in Parliament this year, one of the largest shares. The participation was a central goal for American officials, who tried for months to persuade him to stop fighting and enter politics.
Still, six major leaders here no longer answer to Sadr's organization, according to the intelligence official. Most describe themselves as Mahdi Army members, the official said, and even get money from Sadr's organization, but "are effectively beyond his control." Some of those who moved away from Sadr saw him as too accommodating to the United States. Others saw him as too bound by politics, particularly as killings of Shiite civilians in mixed neighborhoods began to soar.
"They're not content to sit there and just defend their family on the street corner," the official said. "They want to go out and take on what they view as Al Qaeda or Baathists or both in aggressive measure."
One example is Abu Dera, a fighter in the Shiite stronghold of Sadr City in the capital who used to be loyal to Sadr. Residents said that as he began to gain a reputation for killing Sunni figures, Sadr told him to stop. But he ignored the order, and now he is referred to as the "Shiite Zarqawi," after Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the terrorist leader who exhorted Sunnis to kill Shiites.
"He started against the Americans, but he moved on to killing Sunnis," said Sattar Awad, a 29-year-old resident of the district. "People here look at him as a brave man."
American forces are hunting for Dera, the intelligence officer said, but he has eluded capture.
Although the splintering has solved some problems for the American military, it has raised new ones. "In some ways it makes it easier for me because I now have digestible doses I can deal with," said a senior American military official at a briefing on Wednesday, also in Baghdad. "At the same time it creates problems because they are harder to find when they are splintered."
The splintering has changed the tone of the American military's interaction with the Mahdi Army in Sadr City. In past years, American forays into the area would often draw a storm of grenade attacks. But recent American moves into the area have been carried out relatively peacefully: Sadr has not ordered attacks because the men being sought were freelancers like Abu Dera, the intelligence officer said.
The fighters' defections have raised the troubling prospect of more avenues of influence for Iran, the senior intelligence official said. The official cited shipments of weapons with labels that trace back to Iranian weapons manufacturers as evidence that Iran was actively aiding groups in Iraq. And that assistance has not just been limited to Mahdi Army offshoots. "They're not sure who will come out on top, so they fund everybody," the official said of Iran.
Even Sadr, who fashions himself as the quintessential Iraqi nationalist, has reached out to Iran's government, making a very public trip to Iran for talks early this year. He is also trying to reassert control over his power base at home, and to expand his influence, the intelligence official said. "What Sadr is looking for is discipline," the official said.
He said Sadr had begun to increase his exposure in the northern city of Kirkuk and in Diyala Province, both mixed-population areas north of Baghdad where sectarian disputes have been on the rise. There, he is trying to appeal by casting himself as a defender of Shiites against Kurdish and Sunni Arab factions.
Richard A. Oppel Jr. contributed reporting.
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